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This paper argues that hysteresis helps explain the long-run behavior of unemployment.  The natural
rate of unemployment is influenced by the path of actual unemployment, and hence by shifts in aggregate
demand.  I review past evidence for hysteresis effects and present new evidence for 20 developed countries.
A central finding is that large increases in the natural rate are associated with disinflations, and large
decreases with run-ups in inflation.  These facts are consistent with hysteresis theories and inconsistent
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I. INTRODUCTION 
     Much of mainstream macroeconomics is based on an 
Aaccelerationist@ Phillips curve.  It was described by Friedman 
(1968) in his Presidential Address.  A simple form is 
        π = π-1 + α(U-U*),   α<0                     (1) 
Inflation depends on lagged inflation, often interpreted as a 
proxy for expected inflation.  It also depends on the deviation 
of unemployment from the natural rate or NAIRU, U*.
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     According to Friedman, shifts in aggregate demand coming 
from either monetary policy or other sources have short run 
impacts on unemployment.  In the long run, however, U always 
returns to U*.  And U* is not influenced by aggregate demand.  
Instead, it is determined by the supply side of the economy, 
especially frictions in labor markets.  This means the classical 
dichotomy holds in the long run: monetary policy cannot cause 
long-run changes in unemployment. 
                                                 
1 This is an old-fashioned backward-looking Phillips curve, 
replaced in much modern research by the forward-looking New 
Keynesian Phillips Curve.  This paper is based on the premise 
that the old Phillips curve is a useful framework.  The relative 
merits of old and new Phillips curves can be debated elsewhere. 
     Practically speaking, most economists think monetary policy 
can push U away from U* for a few years.  Paul Volcker, for 
example, managed to raise unemployment over 1980-83.  However,  
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changes in unemployment over a decade or more are determined by 
changes in the natural rate.  The fact that unemployment was 
substantially higher in France in 2000 than in 1980 has little or 
nothing to do with monetary policy. 
     This essay questions this conventional wisdom.  I accept 
equation (1), but not the view that only supply-side factors 
influence U*.  I believe in the concept of hysteresis advocated 
by Blanchard and Summers (1986): the natural rate can be 
influenced by the path of actual unemployment.  If U rises above 
U*, for example, there exist mechanisms that pull U* upward. 
Since aggregate demand influences U, hysteresis means that demand 
 also influences U*. 
     Hysteresis is central to long-run unemployment movements in 
many countries.  If we want to know why unemployment rose in much 
of Europe in the 1980s, or why it fell in the U.K. in the 1990s, 
or why it has remained relatively stable in the United States, we 
need to understand hysteresis. 
     This essay addresses two broad issues.  The first is whether 
there is clear evidence of hysteresis effects.  To put it 
differently, can we reject the hypothesis that the NAIRU, and 
hence the long run behavior of unemployment, is independent of 
aggregate demand? 
     The answer to this question is YES! I review past evidence 
on hysteresis and present some new evidence.  
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     The second broad issue is the nature of hysteresis.  Through 
what mechanisms do short-run unemployment movements influence the 
NAIRU?  What determines the strength of these effects in 
different countries and time periods?  What are the implications 
for monetary policy?  
     My discussion of these topics is speculative.  In my view, 
it=s clear that some form of hysteresis exists, but it=s not clear 
why.  The relationships among unemployment, the natural rate, and 
inflation appear to be non-linear, but it=s hard to pin down the 
non-linearities precisely.  As a result, policy implications are 
not crisp.   
     In sum, hysteresis is an important phenomenon, but one that 
is not well understood.  This means more research is needed.  The 
topic of hysteresis has been neglected in recent years, and that 
should change.      
 
II. THE PHILLIPS CURVE AND THE CHANGING NAIRU 
     Friedman (1968) says, AThere is always a temporary tradeoff 
between unemployment and inflation; there is no permanent 
tradeoff.  The temporary tradeoff comes not from inflation per 
se, but from unanticipated inflation, which generally means, from 
a rising rate of inflation.@  Eventually, says Friedman, 
unemployment returns to the natural rate.   
     Friedman=s theory is summarized by equation (1).  Today  
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economists use ANAIRU@ (for non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment) as a synonym for the natural rate, because the 
natural rate is the unemployment level consistent with stable 
inflation.  Forty years after Friedman wrote, equation (1) is a 
foundation for much of applied macroeconomics. 
     Friedman says the natural rate depends on features of the 
labor market such as minimum wages, labor unions, and frictions 
in matching the unemployed with job vacancies.  He says that 
monetary policy cannot affect the natural rate.     
     Friedman suggests that the natural rate may change over 
time, and experience has shown that it does.  In the United 
States, the NAIRU has varied by moderate amounts; according to 
estimates detailed below, it fell from 7.1% in 1980 to 4.9% in 
2007.  In Europe, the NAIRU has changed by larger amounts; in 
Spain, it rose from 6.5% in 1980 to 14.4 in 1995, then fell to 
7.5% in 2007. 
     A large literature has tried to explain changes in the 
NAIRU.  Some researchers focus on changes in labor-market 
imperfections of the type discussed by Friedman (e.g. Nickell, 
2005).  Others examine interactions between such Ainstitutions@ 
and economic Ashocks,@ such as the productivity slowdown and 
globalization (e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Blanchard, 
2005).  While the stories vary, they almost always involve the 
supply side of the economy.  They presume that aggregate demand  
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doesn=t affect the NAIRU. 
     Much work focuses on Europe, where the NAIRU rose 
dramatically between 1960 and 2000.  Mankiw (2006) tells 
undergraduates that there is a Aleading theory@ of this 
experience, one from the class of shock/institution theories.  In 
this story, proposed by Krugman (1994) and others, the shock is a 
decrease in the demand for low-skill labor caused by 
technological change.  The institutions are labor-market 
distortions that create wage rigidity.  The equilibrium wages of 
low-skill workers have fallen but their actual wages have not, so 
unemployment has risen.      
     This story gets much of its appeal from the fact that it 
fits two data points, the United States and aggregate Europe.  
The U.S. has more flexible labor markets than Europe and has not 
experienced a rise in the NAIRU.  We=ll see, however, that the 
story works less well when we extend the sample from two 
economies to twenty.  
     Departing from most of the literature, this paper will argue 
that NAIRU changes are caused largely by shifts in aggregate 
demand.  Demand influences actual unemployment, U, which in turn 
influences the natural rate through hysteresis channels.  
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     What are these channels?  When Blanchard and Summers (1986) 
introduced the idea of hysteresis, they emphasized the Ainsider-
outsider@ theory of wage bargaining.  When workers become 
unemployed, the remaining employed workers increase their wage 
targets, preventing the unemployed from getting their jobs back. 
 In my view, however, there is little evidence for this kind of 
hysteresis effect.   
     There is more evidence for stories in which the long-term 
unemployed become detached from the labor market.  These workers 
are unattractive to employers, or they don=t try hard to find 
jobs.  These stories fit evidence that hysteresis effects are 
stronger in countries with long-lived unemployment benefits.  
However, as discussed below, we have at best a hazy understanding 
of hysteresis mechanisms.  
     Allowing for hysteresis can greatly change our explanations 
for unemployment movements and our prescriptions for monetary 
policy.  However, I don=t view hysteresis as a radical departure 
from mainstream economic theory.  It is not a rejection of 
Friedman=s model, but a generalization of it.  We expand the set 
of factors that cause the U* term in equation (1) to change over 
time: these factors include movements in actual unemployment as 
well as supply-side variables. 
     To study movements in the NAIRU, we need to estimate this 
variable.  One simple method is to smooth the series for actual  
  7 
unemployment with the Hodrick-Prescott filter, based on the idea 
that the NAIRU is the long-term trend in unemployment.  In this 
paper, I use a somewhat more sophisticated technique based on 
Ball and Mankiw (2002).  This procedure modifies the results from 
a univariate smoother based on the behavior of inflation.  During 
a period of falling inflation, for example, the Ball-Mankiw 
method produces lower NAIRU estimates than a univariate smoother, 
because falling inflation suggests that U* is below U. 
     The Appendix to this paper details my procedure for 
estimating the NAIRU.  As an example of the results, Figure 1 
shows the estimated NAIRU for France from 1980 to 2007 and 
compares it to a univariate unemployment trend (based on the HP 
filter with λ=100).  The estimated NAIRU is below the univariate 
trend over 1980-1997, reflecting the fact that inflation was 
falling.  After that the two series converge, as inflation was 
stable. 
     I estimate NAIRU series for twenty countries: all the 
countries with populations above one million that were members of 
the OECD in 1985.  This group includes 15 countries in Western 
Europe, two each in North America and the Antipodes, and Japan.   
     I focus on the period since 1980.  The NAIRU rose in many 
countries during the 1970s, but it is harder to detect hysteresis 
effects in that period.  The large supply shocks make it harder  
to estimate Phillips curves and NAIRUs.  Also, there was a major  
  8 
change in the real economy B- the productivity slowdown B- that 
probably increased the NAIRU in many countries.  Hysteresis 
effects may have been secondary in the 1970s.  Since 1980, 
however, hysteresis is a big part of the unemployment story. 
 
III. PREVIOUS EVIDENCE OF HYSTERESIS 
     This paper will confess to major gaps in our understanding 
of hysteresis, but argue that it clearly exists in some form.  
That is, there is strong evidence against the hypothesis that 
movements in the NAIRU are independent of aggregate demand. 
     Here I discuss evidence for hysteresis in previous work.  I 
emphasize two papers from some time ago: Ball (1997) and Ball 
(1999).  The reason I focus on my own past work is not narcissism 
(or, at least, that=s not the only reason).  Beyond my work, 
there isn=t much literature to review, as most researchers of the 
21
st century have ignored hysteresis.  However, the Boston Fed=s 
invitation to write about the topic has rekindled my hope that 
economists will take it seriously.
2 
Disinflations in the 1980s 
     My 1997 paper examines changes in the NAIRU from 1980 to 
1990.  It uses estimates of the NAIRU produced by the OECD with a 
method that is similar in spirit to the Ball-Mankiw method.  
                                                 
2 Another promising sign is Stockhammer and Sturn (2008), 
which updates and extends the analysis in Ball (1999).  
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According to these estimates, the NAIRU rose over the 1980s in 17 
of the 20 countries in the sample.  NAIRU changes ranged from -
1.4% in the U.S. and Portugal to +9.3% in Ireland. 
     I argue that NAIRU increases in the 1980s were caused 
largely by monetary tightenings aimed at reducing inflation.  
This conclusion is based on the following evidence: 
   C Measures of labor market distortions B- the degree of 
unionization, the severity of firing restrictions, and so on B-  
are generally uncorrelated across countries with changes in the 
NAIRU.  The only exception is a weak effect of the duration of 
unemployment benefits.  Overall, this is evidence against the 
Krugman story about the interaction of labor demand shifts with 
labor market rigidities.  That story predicts greater increases 
in the NAIRU where rigidities are greater. 
   C 19 of the 20 countries reduced inflation over the 1980s. 
There is a significant relationship across countries between the 
size of the inflation decrease and the change in the NAIRU.  My 
interpretation is that larger disinflations required larger 
monetary tightenings, therefore raised unemployment more, 
therefore raised the NAIRU more through hysteresis. 
   C The change in the NAIRU is related not only to how much 
inflation fell, but also to the length of time over which 
disinflation occurred.  Holding constant the total fall in 
inflation, a quick disinflation raises the NAIRU less than one  
  10 
that is drawn out over time.  This result suggests mechanisms for 
hysteresis, as discussed below. 
   C While measures of labor-market distortions are generally 
uncorrelated with NAIRU changes, one of these variables B-  the 
duration of unemployment benefits -- interacts significantly with 
the size and length of disinflation.  That is, a given 
disinflation is associated with a larger rise in the NAIRU if 
unemployment benefits are available indefinitely.  Once we 
control for this interaction, there is no direct effect of 
benefit duration.  Again, this result is suggestive about 
hysteresis mechanisms. 
Policy Responses to Recessions 
     My 1999 paper examines the disinflations of the 1980s from 
another angle.  Countries that reduced inflation generally 
experienced recessions and short-run rises in unemployment. 
However, the aftermath of disinflation varied: in some countries 
unemployment fell again after a few years, while in others the 
NAIRU rose and unemployment stayed high.    
     I argue that these differences are largely explained by the 
conduct of monetary policy.  Some central banks tightened policy 
to reduce inflation, but reversed course when recessions 
occurred.  They eased policy, pushing unemployment back down.  
Other central banks tightened policy and kept it tight, so high 
unemployment persisted.  
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     To make this argument, the 1999 paper measures policy 
responses to recessions with changes in nominal and real interest 
rates (following Romer and Romer [1994]).  The Fed is one central 
bank that cut rates sharply when recessions began, even though 
inflation had not yet fallen significantly.  Many European 
central banks, by contrast, did not respond aggressively to 
recessions.  They were reluctant to ease policy until inflation 
was clearly defeated.  In addition, exchange rate concerns 
deterred some central banks from cutting interest rates.    
     The paper also measures the degree of hysteresis in each 
country by comparing increases in the NAIRU to short-run 
increases in unemployment during disinflation.  I find that 
hysteresis effects are larger when central banks respond less 
strongly to recessions. 
     By itself, the fact that persistently tight policy causes 
persistently high unemployment is consistent with conventional 
macro, specifically the IS curve.  Where the early-80s experience 
deviates from conventional models is in the behavior of 
inflation.  If a monetary tightening doesn=t affect the NAIRU, 
then equation (1) says inflation should fall as long as 
unemployment remains high.  In many countries, inflation fell for 
a few years but then leveled off with unemployment still high.  
This meant by definition that the NAIRU rose.  
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Success Stories 
     The NAIRU started falling in some countries in the mid-
1980s.  Another part of my 1999 paper asks why.  I focus on four 
countries that reduced the NAIRU (as estimated by the OECD) by at 
least 2 percentage points between 1985 and 1997.  One is the 
U.K., which reversed the NAIRU run-up of the early 1980s; the 
others are Ireland, Netherlands, and Portugal.  
     Many observers attribute these NAIRU decreases to reductions 
in labor-market distortions (e.g. Siebert, 1997).  But this 
interpretation does not withstand scrutiny.  Countries where the 
NAIRU fell did implement some labor-market reforms, but they were 
modest.  For example, the Netherlands slightly reduced the 
replacement ratio for UI, and the U.K. increased job counseling 
for UI recipients; neither put a time limit on benefits.  Many 
other countries had similar or more extensive labor market 
reforms (Spain reduced the replacement ratio by the same amount 
as the Netherlands, and Belgium introduced a job-placement 
program similar to the UK=s).  The four countries where 
unemployment fell don=t stand out as aggressive labor market 
reformers. 
     Instead, these countries stand out for their macroeconomic 
histories: they experienced demand expansions during the period 
when the NAIRU fell.  The demand expansions reduced unemployment, 
which reduced the NAIRU through hysteresis.  
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     The U.K., for example, departed from the monetary policy of 
other European countries when it dropped out of the ERM in 1992 
and lowered interest rates.  Before that, in the late 1980s, the 
U.K. experienced the ALawson boom,@ named after the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer who pursued fiscal expansion at the same time 
financial liberalization raised consumption and investment.  The 
Bank of England was slow to tighten policy to choke off the boom, 
and inflation rose by more than five percentage points.   
     A substantial run-up in inflation also accompanied the NAIRU 
decreases in Portugal and the Netherlands (although not Ireland). 
 As in the U.K., central banks did not raise inflation 
intentionally, but they failed to offset expansionary shocks.  In 
my view, the coincidence of rising inflation with a falling NAIRU 
suggests that hysteresis is at work, that is, that a demand 
expansion is driving the NAIRU down.  I return to this point 
below.   
     An important nuance is that the inflation run-ups in the 
U.K. and elsewhere were not permanent.  A period of overheating 
and rising inflation was needed to reduce the NAIRU, but 
eventually inflation went back down.  And when that happened, the 
NAIRU did not go back up.   
 
IV. SOME NEW EVIDENCE 
     Here I present new evidence of hysteresis effects.  I try to  
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capture these effects in a simple way using data from 1980 
through 2007. 
     My strategy is to focus on large changes in the NAIRU.  I 
define large to mean a rise or fall of at least three percentage 
points.  While my method for estimating the NAIRU is imprecise, 
an estimated change of 3% almost certainly indicates a 
substantial change in the true NAIRU. 
    I restrict attention to episodes in which the NAIRU changed 
by at least 3% within a period of ten years.  This ten-year rule 
means I ignore changes in the NAIRU that are substantial but very 
gradual.  It is harder to identify the sources of gradual changes 
than of relatively abrupt changes. 
    Usually the ten-year periods I identify lie within longer 
periods in which the NAIRU moves in the same direction.  I define 
a NAIRU-change episode as the entire period in which the NAIRU 
moves in one direction.  This implies that episodes start and end 
at peaks and troughs in the NAIRU series, or at the start and end 
of the 1980-2007 period.  
     In France, for example, the NAIRU increased from 1980, when 
it was 5.4%, to 1996, when it peaked at 9.4% (see Figure 1).  
This period qualifies for my set of episodes because the NAIRU 
rose by more than 3% over the ten years from 1980 to 1990.   
    For the 20 countries in the sample, there are eight episodes 
of NAIRU increases that meet my criteria and nine episodes of  
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NAIRU decreases.  Table 1 lists the episodes, their dates, and 
the changes in the NAIRU over the episodes. 
     For each episode, I examine the behavior of inflation.  This 
seems a natural way to distinguish between conventional stories 
about NAIRU changes and hysteresis theories.  In hysteresis 
theories, changes in the NAIRU are driven by demand movements 
that initially push U away from U*.  Assuming equation (1) holds, 
we should see rising inflation if strong demand is pushing the 
NAIRU down, and falling inflation if the NAIRU is rising.  That 
is, inflation and the NAIRU should move in opposite directions. 
     The implications for inflation are different if real 
factors, such as changes in productivity growth or in labor-
market distortions, cause changes in the NAIRU.  In this case, 
one possibility is that the central bank adjusts U to keep it 
near U*.  If that happens, inflation remains stable as U* 
changes. 
     Another possibility is that actual unemployment lags behind 
changes in the NAIRU.  In this case inflation moves in the same 
direction as the NAIRU, the opposite of the comovement predicted 
by hysteresis theories.  Orphanides (2000) argues that this 
happened in the United States in the 1970s.  The NAIRU rose but 
policymakers did not recognize the change, so they tried to hold 
unemployment at the old NAIRU.  With U below U*, inflation rose. 
     In examining inflation behavior, as with unemployment, I  
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look for large changes.  I identify major disinflations, defined 
as a fall of at least 3% in Atrend inflation.@  Following Ball 
(1994, 1999), trend inflation is measured by a nine-quarter 
centered moving average of inflation.  Similarly, I identify 
major inflation run-ups, defined as increases in trend inflation 
of at least 3%.  I ask whether episodes of large changes in the 
NAIRU are associated with large disinflations or inflation run-
ups.
3 
     For each of the 17 episodes of major NAIRU changes, Table 2 
shows the disinflations and inflation run-ups that occurred 
within the episode or overlapped with it significantly.  The 
Table gives the dates and sizes of the inflation movements.  A 
given NAIRU-change episode includes from zero to three inflation-
change episodes. 
                                                 
3  An alternative would be to measure the total change in 
trend inflation over the NAIRU-change episode.  One problem with 
this approach is that the results would be sensitive to the 
dating of starts and ends of episodes.  These dates are hard to 
pin down with confidence, as they depend on how the series for  
unemployment is smoothed.  
     In addition, simply examining total inflation changes would 
hide the fact that significant fluctuations in inflation can 
occur within a NAIRU-change episode.  As shown in Table 2, some 
episodes include both a disinflation and an inflation run-up.   
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     What do we learn from Table 2?  Let=s first examine the 
episodes of increasing NAIRUs.  In six of these eight episodes, 
there was a significant disinflation, and no inflation run-up.  
The other two cases, Sweden and New Zealand, have the pattern of 
a disinflation followed by an inflation run-up followed by 
another disinflation.  In both of these cases, each of the 
disinflations is larger than the intervening runup, and the total 
change in inflation over the three periods is highly negative (-
9.2% in Sweden and -14.7% in New Zealand).  I interpret these two 
countries as having disinflationary regimes overall, despite an 
interruption in disinflation.
4   
     I therefore count all eight episodes of NAIRU increases as 
involving disinflations.  One way to put the result is that a 
major NAIRU increase is sufficient to tell us that a country 
experienced a major disinflation: 
 
       NAIRU Increase --> Disinflation 
 
where the arrow does not indicate causality, but rather 
sufficiency in the sense that if you find an episode with a NAIRU 
increase, it is always an episode with a major disinflation.  To 
put the same result a different way, a major disinflation is a 
                                                 
4 In New Zealand=s case, the seesaw pattern of inflation may 
reflect wage and price controls, which were introduced in 1982  
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necessary condition for a NAIRU increase. 
     Note that the reverse result does not hold: a disinflation 
is not sufficient for a NAIRU increase (equivalently, a NAIRU 
increase is not necessary for disinflation).  Many countries in 
the sample experienced major disinflations without the NAIRU 
rising by 3%.  In some countries, such as the United States and 
Norway, disinflation occurred with almost no change in the NAIRU. 
      Now let=s examine decreases in the NAIRU.  Here the story 
is more complex. 
                                                                                                                                                             
and lifted in 1984.    
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     Of the nine NAIRU-decrease episodes, five include at least 
one inflation run-up.  One of these five episodes, in the 
Netherlands, includes two run-ups and no disinflations.  The 
other four include a disinflation as well as a run-up.  However, 
in contrast to the cases of Sweden and New Zealand, the inflation 
run-ups and disinflations are similar sizes.  In Australia, 
Ireland, and the U.K., the inflation run-up and disinflation 
(which are always contiguous) sum to 0.7%, 0.7%, and -1.5%, 
respectively.  Portugal is a special case of volatile inflation: 
there are two inflation run-ups with a large disinflation in-
between.  The total inflation change over these episodes is -
4.7%.
5 
     Overall, I interpret these five episodes as consistent with 
 hysteresis theories.  In each case, the fall in the NAIRU 
produced a major inflation run-up at some point, suggesting 
demand expansions.  These demand expansions reduced the NAIRU 
because they were not overwhelmed by much larger disinflations, 
as in Sweden and New Zealand.    
                                                 
5 A referee suggests that Australia=s inflation run-up was 
caused by the introduction of a sales tax.  However, the tax was 
introduced in July 2000, and most of the run-up occurred before 
then.  My measure of trend inflation rose from 0.6% in 1998Q1 to 
4.2% in 2000Q2.  Over the same period, a backward-looking four-
quarter average of inflation rose from -0.2% to 3.2%. 
     The evidence shows, however, that reducing the NAIRU does 
not require a permanent increase in inflation.  This is most  
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clear in Ireland and the U.K., where an inflation run-up was 
followed by a disinflation of similar magnitude.  A successful 
theory of hysteresis will need to explain this pattern.  
     Four countries have decreases in the NAIRU with neither 
inflation run-ups nor disinflations: Finland, Italy, New Zealand, 
and Spain.  Notice that, in all four cases, the episodes of 
falling NAIRUs followed large NAIRU increases, and only partly 
reversed these increases.  The decreases look like some kind of 
mean reversion.  One interpretation is that hysteresis effects 
are long-lived but not permanent.  Tight monetary policy causes a 
rise in unemployment that lasts a long time, but eventually 
unemployment starts falling even if inflation is stable.  
     Note that four of the NAIRU decreases in Table 1 were not 
preceded by large NAIRU increases.  These four episodes are among 
the five in which a NAIRU decrease was accompanied by a run-up in 
inflation.  So the data suggest that a rise in inflation is 
necessary for reducing the NAIRU if mean reversion is not at 
work.  We can summarize the results with 
 
   NAIRU Decrease --> Previous NAIRU Increase or Inflation Run-up 
 
capturing the fact that all NAIRU decreases involve at least one 
of the factors on the right of the arrow. 
     We can also look at the inflation run-up / NAIRU  
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relationship from the other direction.  Table 3 lists all 
episodes of inflation run-ups since 1980 B- those included in 
Table 2 and those not included in Table 2 because they did not 
coincide with major changes in the NAIRU.  The episodes are 
ranked by the size of the inflation increase.  
     I want to argue that inflation run-ups are associated with 
decreases in the NAIRU.  That=s not true for all of the run-ups 
in Table 3, but I have good excuses for discounting some of these 
cases.  The two with asterisks are the Swedish and New Zealand 
episodes in which inflation run-ups interrupt regimes that are 
disinflationary overall.  In the two cases with double asterisks, 
in Japan and Switzerland, a 3% decrease in the NAIRU was 
impossible because the NAIRU was less than 3% when inflation 
started to rise. 
     That leaves nine inflation run-ups, and seven of them 
occurred during periods of NAIRU decreases.  The two that didn=t 
are the two smallest inflation run-ups on the list B- early run-
ups in Australia and Finland.  So, among inflation run-ups that 
were not sandwiched between big disinflations, and where the 
NAIRU was not below 3% initially, the seven largest run-ups 
occurred during episodes of NAIRU decreases.  To a first 
approximation we can say 
 
             Inflation run-up --> Decrease in NAIRU  
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With some qualifications, an inflation run-up is sufficient for a 
NAIRU decrease (or a NAIRU decrease is necessary for an inflation 
run-up). 
     To summarize, the patterns we see in these data are complex. 
 It appears, however, that there are relationships of some type 
among large rises and falls in the NAIRU and large rises and 
falls in inflation.  These relationships generally go in the 
direction predicted by hysteresis theories.  The data are 
inconsistent with purely real theories of NAIRU changes, which 
predict either no relationship between NAIRU changes and 
inflation or a positive relationship. 
V. OPEN QUESTIONS 
     While there is evidence that hysteresis exists, there are 
many open questions about the nature of the phenomenon. 
What Mechanism? 
     Why might hystersis exist?  In introducing the concept, 
Blanchard and Summers explained it with an insider-outsider model 
of wage bargaining.  These models have not been popular in recent 
years, however, and there may be good reason.  There isn=t much 
empirical evidence for insider-outsider models.  In particular, 
they suggest that the degree of hysteresis should depend on wage-
setting institutions, and that doesn=t seem to be the case.  For 
example, my 1997 paper finds no link between hysteresis and a  
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country=s level of unionization.  
     A more promising idea, which Blanchard and Summers discuss 
but deemphasize, involves the behavior of the long-term 
unemployed.  The key idea is that these workers become detached 
from the labor market, both because they appear unattractive to 
employers and because they don=t search vigorously for jobs.  
Consequently, while a high level of short-term unemployment puts 
downward pressure on wage inflation, a high level of long-term 
unemployment does not. 
     If this effect is strong, then it potentially explains 
hysteresis.  One story is that a decrease in aggregate demand 
initially causes a rise in short-term unemployment, but this 
turns into long-term unemployment if the slump continues.  The 
initial short-term unemployment causes inflation to fall, but 
then inflation stabilizes.  At that point the NAIRU is higher 
because of the large pool of long-term unemployed.   
     This story is lent plausibility by evidence (in both my 1997 
and 1999 papers) that a long duration of unemployment benefits 
magnifies hysteresis.  Presumably it is more likely that the 
long-term unemployed become detached from the labor market if 
they can live on the dole indefinitely. 
     The story is also consistent with Llaudes (2007), who 
estimates Phillips curves with separate terms for long-term and 
short-term unemployment.  For many countries, Llaudes finds that  
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long-term unemployment has smaller effects on inflation.  This 
result is stronger in countries with long-lived unemployment 
benefits.  
     Yet current stories about hysteresis mechanisms are 
speculative.  More research is needed.  In particular, 
researchers should directly examine the idea that the long-term 
unemployed become detached from the labor market.  One method 
would be interviews of the type in Bewley (1999).  Researchers 
could ask employers about their attitudes toward the long-term 
unemployed, and ask the unemployed about their search behavior. 
Non-linearities and State-dependence 
     In explaining the idea of hysteresis to students, I 
sometimes combine the Phillips curve, equation (1), with 
        U* = (1-μ)U*-1 + μU-1                  (2)                       
Here, the NAIRU is pulled toward actual unemployment.  The 
parameter μ measures the degree of hysteresis. 
     Empirically, however, it=s clear that no such linear 
relationship exists.  Changes in U sometimes cause changes in U* 
and sometimes don=t.  It seems to depend on the past history of 
U* and the length of time that U is pushed away from U*.  
Hysteresis also appears asymmetric (e.g. an inflation run-up 
means it=s very likely U* is falling, while disinflations often 
occur without U* rising). 
     As usual, it=s difficult to measure non-linearities  
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precisely.  And our hazy understanding of hysteresis mechanisms 
means theory doesn=t give us much guidance.  However, there are 
promising avenues for research. 
     In particular, there should be more work examining the time-
series behavior of short-term and long-term unemployment.  
Suppose, as suggested by Llaudes= work, that long-term 
unemployment puts less pressure on inflation than short-term 
unemployment.  Then we can learn about the varying effects of U 
on U* by examining the evolution of U of different durations.  
For example, we can directly check whether NAIRU increases are 
tied to shifts from short-term to long-term unemployment. 
     We also might better understand why some countries reduce 
the NAIRU without significant effects on inflation, while 
inflation rises in other cases.  Perhaps in some countries a 
demand expansion cuts into long-term unemployment without much 
effect on short-term unemployment.  Elsewhere, a NAIRU decrease 
involves falling short-term unemployment, either because there is 
less long-term unemployment initially or because demand expands 
more rapidly.  In this case, the effects on inflation are likely 
to be larger.  
Policy Implications 
     If hysteresis exists, a broad lesson is that it=s dangerous 
for central banks to focus policy too heavily on inflation, 
either through explicit inflation targeting or otherwise.  If the  
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natural rate is independent of monetary policy, then focusing on 
inflation can at worst exacerbate short-run unemployment 
movements.  With hysteresis, by contrast, a given inflation 
target is consistent with more than one level of unemployment, 
even in the long run.  A central bank might achieve its inflation 
target but create needlessly high unemployment in the process. 
     A closely related point is that policy should ease when a 
recession occurs.  This principle might seem like common sense, 
and the Fed has followed it (Romer and Romer, 1994), but not all 
central banks have.  Ball (1999) finds that inadequate responses 
to recessions have contributed to hysteresis in some countries. 
     One can dream up more novel ideas for policy based on the 
types of hysteresis effects that seem to exist.  For example, 
maybe central banks facing high unemployment should expand 
demand, accepting a rise in inflation to reduce the NAIRU.  Then 
they should tighten policy to reduce inflation, but reverse the 
tightening quickly, before a temporary rise in unemployment can 
push the NAIRU back up.  
     However, central banks generally presume that steady 
policies are better than tricky plans for first overheating and 
then underheating the economy.  We would need much greater 
confidence in our understanding of hysteresis to give contrary 
advice. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
     In the last decade, mainstream economists have not paid much 
attention to the idea of hysteresis.  Likely reasons include the 
theoretical appeal of long-run neutrality and our weak 
understanding of hysteresis mechanisms.  In addition, many 
economists interpret the 1960s and 70s as showing that it=s 
dangerous for central banks to target unemployment.  Hysteresis 
stories evoke negative reactions because they seem like a step 
back toward the bad old days.
6  
     Yet there is considerable evidence that hysteresis is an 
important factor in unemployment behavior.  And there are clear 
avenues for research, for example using data on short-term and 
long-term unemployment.  I hope hysteresis becomes a more popular 
topic in the future. 
                                                 
6 Another factor is that Blanchard and Summers have been 
poor stewards of their hysteresis idea.  Summers has been busy 
with other things.  Blanchard has written extensively about 
unemployment since 1985, but much of his work explicitly or 
implicitly denies the existence of hysteresis.  For example, 
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) take it as given that shifts in 
aggregate demand affect actual unemployment but not Aequilibrium@ 
unemployment.  When even the creator of an idea doesn=t seem to 
believe it, the idea loses credibility. 
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APPENDIX: ESTIMATING THE NAIRU 
     To estimate the NAIRU, Ball and Mankiw (2002) first estimate 
the parameter α in 
        π  =  π-1 + α(U-U*) + ε                          (3) 
which is equation (1) with an error ε, which we interpret as a 
short-run supply shock.  We estimate α by OLS, treating U* as a 
constant.  
     Rearranging equation (3) gives us 
       U* - (1/α)ε  =  U - (1/α)(π-π-1)                  (4) 
We construct the right side of this equation from the estimated α 
and data on unemployment and inflation, giving us the left side. 
 This expression, U*-(1/α)ε, is the NAIRU minus a term 
proportional to the supply shock.  We smooth this series with the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter to get NAIRU estimates. 
     The Ball-Mankiw procedure is internally inconsistent because 
it estimates a time-varying U*, but assumes a constant U* to 
estimate α.  Here I resolve this inconsistency with an iterative 
procedure.  Once I have a series for U*, I use that series to re-
estimate equation (3), yielding a new estimate of α.  I use the 
new α to estimate a new series for U*, and so on until the 
results converge to an α and a U* series that are consistent. 
     This procedure is applied to data from 1975 through 2007.  
(I only use NAIRU estimates for 1980-2007, but I start the  
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estimation in 1975 to minimize endpoint problems.)  I use a λ 
parameter of 100 in the HP filter.  
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 Table  I 
 





Country       Period of Change      Size of Change 
 
Finland       1980-1996              9.7% 
 
France        1980-1996              4.0% 
 
Germany       1980-2007              5.6% 
 
Ireland       1980-1989              5.2% 
 
Italy         1980-1996              4.9% 
 
New Zealand   1980-1994              4.9% 
 
Spain         1980-1995              7.8% 
 






Country       Period of Change       Size of Change 
 
Australia     1994-2007              -4.0% 
 
Finland       1996-2007              -4.3% 
 
Ireland       1989-2007             -11.0% 
 
Italy         1996-2007              -3.9% 
 
Netherlands   1988-2007              -3.8% 
 
New Zealand   1994-2007              -4.1% 
 
Portugal      1981-1992              -3.3% 
 
Spain         1995-2007              -6.9% 
 
UK            1987-2007              -4.4%  
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 Table  2 
 
  Major Inflation Changes During Changes in the NAIRU 
 
 
EPISODES OF NAIRU INCREASES 
 
NAIRU-Change Episode           Major Changes in Inflation       
 
Finland 80-86          -8.2%, 81-86                
 
France 80-96          -10.4%, 81-87 
 
Germany 80-07         - 5.9%, 81-86 
 
Ireland 80-89         -16.7%, 81-87  
 
Italy 80-96           -14.4%, 80-87 
 
NZ 80-94               -8.9%, 80-83; +8.6%, 83-85; -14.4%, 85-92 
 
Spain 80-95            -5.2%, 89-97 
 




EPISODES OF NAIRU DECREASES 
 
NAIRU-Change Episode         Major Changes in Inflation 
 
















UK, 87-07             +5.6%, 86-89; -7.1%, 89-93  
  34 
 Table  3 
 
  All Inflation Run-ups, 1980-2007 
 
 
Portugal 80-84              8.8% 
 
New Zealand 83-85           8.6%* 
 
UK 86-89                    5.6% 
 
Sweden 86-90                5.6%* 
 
Switzerland 86-90           4.7%** 
 
Netherlands 86-89           4.4% 
 
Portugal 87-89              4.0% 
 
Ireland 98-01               3.9% 
 
Japan 87-90                 3.9%** 
 
Australia 98-01             3.8% 
 
Netherlands 97-00           3.8% 
 
Australia 84-86             3.2% 
 





    * Preceded and followed by larger disinflations 
 
    ** Initial NAIRU <3%  




Unemployment in France 
 
 
        